What defines a strong NATO ally? Since the alliance’s founding in 1949, debates over burden-sharing have been constant. Donald Trump, both in his first and current term, has sharply criticized European members for underfunding their defense while relying on U.S. protection—and not without reason.
His message is resonating. Belgium’s defense minister recently vowed to end the country’s “national shame” of being NATO’s most notorious free rider. Even Iceland, which lacks a standing army, is exploring how to contribute more meaningfully.
To assess NATO members’ contributions, consider the “three Cs”: cash, capabilities, and commitment.
Cash: More Members Are Meeting Targets—But Is It Enough?
Today, 22 of NATO’s 32 members meet the 2% of GDP defense spending target, a big jump from just seven a decade ago. Italy and Spain are on track to join them this year. But the bar is rising: at the upcoming summit in The Hague, NATO is expected to adopt a new target of 3.5% of GDP, plus 1.5% for supporting infrastructure.
Still, raw spending figures can be misleading. Some countries inflate their numbers by including loosely related expenses under “defense.”
Capabilities: What the Money Buys Matters More
NATO recommends that at least 20% of defense budgets go toward equipment—most members comply, and that threshold may soon rise to 33%. But quantity doesn’t equal quality. Greece, for example, spends heavily on gear, but much of it is aimed at deterring Turkey, not Russia.
The NATO Defense Planning Process aims to align national purchases with alliance needs. After years of counterterrorism focus, the threat from Russia is refocusing priorities. Allies are now being asked to build forces primarily for deterrence in Europe.
New “capability targets” expected this month will guide what each country should provide—especially in areas where the U.S. may scale back, like intelligence, long-range strike, and logistics.
Commitment: Who Shows Up?
Operationally, even the most frugal allies are stepping up. Spain leads a multinational brigade in Slovakia; Italy commands one in Bulgaria. Portuguese jets patrol Baltic airspace. Smaller nations like Albania and Slovenia also contribute troops to NATO’s eastern flank.
But NATO wants more. In a major conflict, it aims to deploy 100,000 troops within 10 days and another 200,000 within 30. Without more European investment in recruitment and readiness, those goals may be out of reach—especially without U.S. troops.
A Smarter Division of Labor?
NATO is exploring a “multi-speed” model: larger militaries take on high-end combat roles, while smaller states focus on logistics, cyber, or niche capabilities. Luxembourg, for instance, supports satellite communications and surveillance; Iceland runs an air-defense system.
Getting underperformers like Spain and Italy to specialize more effectively may be key. Encouraging them to invest in maritime capabilities could be a strategic win.
