The geopolitical landscape of the 21st century is shifting rapidly, demanding a reassessment of established security structures. For decades, the European Union has relied on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the bedrock of its security. This alliance provided stability during the Cold War, but in today’s multipolar world, this deep and limiting dependency on the United States is becoming increasingly untenable.
If the EU is to become a truly independent global actor, it must make the difficult but necessary decision to step out of NATO and build its own sovereign defense architecture. One of the clearest, most damaging proofs of this divergent reality can be found in the West’s fractured approach to Iran.
The Divergence of Strategic Interests and the Iran Lesson
The core of the problem lies in the fundamental strategic priorities of Washington and Brussels, which are no longer fully aligned. While the United States is increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and its systemic rivalry with China, Europe’s primary security concerns remain centered on its immediate neighborhood: Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East.
This divergence is nowhere more apparent than in the catastrophic failure of unified transatlantic policy towards Iran. For decades, European powers, notably the E3 (Germany, France, and the UK), led meticulous diplomatic efforts to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. This agreement was hailed as a benchmark for European soft power and a critical security measure for the region.
However, the 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the deal by the Trump administration, followed by the re-imposition of crippling economic sanctions, fundamentally undermined European strategic interests. The EU was effectively held hostage by American policy. European businesses, which had started to invest in Iran, were forced to retreat, and European banks were threatened with exclusion from the US financial system.
The EU’s subsequent attempts to create alternative payment mechanisms, like INSTEX, proved ineffective, highlighting how American unilateralism can invalidate European sovereignty. The US’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, far from stabilizing the region, heightened tensions, creating a direct security threat for Europe.
The lesson from Iran is clear: As long as the EU is bound within a security framework dominated by the United States, it will remain vulnerable to Washington’s policy swings. European security and economic interests are too often subordinated to American strategic goals, limiting Europe’s diplomatic flexibility and its ability to engage with critical regional actors on its own terms.
The Catalyst for Military and Technological Autonomy
True geopolitical power requires military and technological independence. Currently, European defense relies heavily on American hardware, intelligence, and command structures. This reliance creates a comfort zone that prevents the European defense industry from reaching its full potential.
Leaving NATO would serve as a forced catalyst for integration. It would compel the EU to consolidate its fragmented military capabilities, invest heavily in its own defense technology, and create a unified European command. Instead of buying off-the-shelf American systems, European capital would flow into European innovation, strengthening our technological independence and creating a robust, self-sufficient defense industrial base.
Confronting the Consequences
We must be realistic about the consequences of such a monumental shift. Transitioning away from NATO is not a step to be taken lightly. The immediate effects would be severe and demanding:
Financial Burden: The cost of replacing the American security umbrella will be immense. EU member states will need to drastically and permanently increase defense spending, diverting funds from other national budgets.
Short-Term Vulnerability: During the transition phase, the EU would experience a temporary gap in deterrence capabilities, particularly regarding nuclear deterrence and high-end military logistics.
Diplomatic Friction: A European exit from NATO would fundamentally alter transatlantic relations, likely leading to economic and political friction with the United States and non-EU NATO members like the United Kingdom.
Internal Political Division: Forging a unified European army and foreign policy will require overcoming deep-seated national interests and political resistance within the EU itself.
The Path Forward
Despite these daunting hurdles, the challenges are not insurmountable. Every complex systemic problem can be analyzed and solved with sufficient political will and strategic foresight.
For the European Union to secure its future, protect its economic interests, and stand as an equal among global superpowers, it must graduate from its historical reliance on Washington.
The path to a sovereign, secure, and technologically independent Europe will be expensive and politically fraught. However, the alternative is to remain a permanent junior partner in a changing world order.
True European autonomy is only possible outside the confines of NATO.
After weeks of threatening language from the American presidency, the European Union has reached its limit. Yesterday, the 27 member states proposed a 93 billion euro package of measures following the announcement of import tariffs on eight European countries participating in a Greenland mission.
US-EU Greenland Conflict
EU Strategy
Whether this will be enough to force a reversal of policy remains to be seen. However, observers suggest the EU has more than one strategic advantage.
There is a growing realization among member states that a firm stance is now required. When an ally threatens to seize territory from a European nation, the Union is left with no other choice.
The EU package is viewed as a significant opening signal. The measures involve import tariffs on American products such as jeans, motorcycles, and aircraft. These products are primarily manufactured in regions with high concentrations of government supporters. By targeting these areas, the EU believes it can cause significant economic and political pressure.
The announced 10 percent import tariff for the eight countries, including the Netherlands, is set to take effect on February 1. If this plan is not withdrawn, the European counter-tariffs will also commence.
EU member states hope to avoid this escalation through diplomacy. In the coming week, efforts will be centered on the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, where many leaders will be present. However, the period of caution and accommodation appears to be over, replaced by a shift toward firmer action.
The EU had already drafted this list of import tariffs last year following the outbreak of a global trade war. While the measures were withdrawn after a temporary agreement in July, they were brought back into play during an emergency meeting yesterday.
‘Trade Bazooka’
The EU holds another major strategic asset: the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). This tool, often referred to as the ‘trade bazooka’, allows the EU to deny companies from third countries access to the European internal market.
This instrument has been in development for several years, intended primarily as a deterrent. The expectation is that the threat of its use should be sufficient to prevent economic aggression from other nations.
While there have been repeated calls for its deployment over the past year, the likelihood of it being activated has now increased significantly.
Boundaries
The EU is currently navigating a difficult diplomatic path. While it is deemed necessary to use the language of power to influence decision-making, there are clear risks involved.
A major concern is the potential impact on other geopolitical conflicts, such as the situation in Ukraine. A severe escalation in trade tensions could lead to a scenario where security guarantees for Europe are weakened, a situation that must be avoided.
Despite these risks, there is a consensus that the EU must keep all options on the table. The European market remains the most powerful tool available, and there is a readiness to utilize the provisions within the anti-coercion instrument if necessary.
Playing on Prestige
Strategic efforts may also focus on the American desire for historical prestige regarding the acquisition of Greenland. This ambition has existed for over a century, though previous attempts were always rebuffed.
The EU can frame the consequences of this conflict by highlighting how such actions could be remembered as the catalyst for the fragmentation of Western alliances and NATO. This appeal to historical legacy is seen as a potential point of leverage.
What is the ‘trade bazooka’?
The term trade bazooka is the unofficial nickname for the European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). This is a powerful trade policy weapon that was officially adopted in 2023.
This is what the instrument entails:
Purpose: It is designed to retaliate when non-EU countries apply economic pressure to force the EU or a member state into specific political concessions.
Extensive powers: Beyond standard tariffs, the EU can deny companies access to the internal market, restrict foreign investment, block access to public contracts, and limit intellectual property rights.
Speed: The European Commission has been granted the authority to act faster and more decisively, reducing the time previously required for consensus among all member states.
Deterrence: The impact of these measures is designed to be so significant that the mere threat should discourage other countries from attempting economic blackmail.
The global economy rests on a delicate balance of trust and investment. At the heart of this system lies the US Treasury market. However, a hypothetical scenario exists that economists often describe as a financial nuclear bomb.
This scenario is no longer just a mathematical exercise but a potential geopolitical tool. If the United States, under the Trump administration, were to take the unprecedented step of militarily attacking and conquering Greenland, Europe could be forced to respond with its most powerful economic weapon.
Imagine if every European entity (including governments, central banks, and private investors) decided to simultaneously dump their combined holdings of approximately $3.6 trillion in US Treasury bonds as a direct consequence of such an invasion.
The Chain Reaction
If this “horror scenario” were to unfold, here is the step by step breakdown of what would likely happen:
A Crash in Bond Prices: A sudden flood of $3.6 trillion worth of bonds onto the market would cause their value to plummet instantly due to the massive oversupply.
Skyrocketing Interest Rates: As bond prices crash, the yields (interest rates) would spike to extreme levels. This would make US government debt significantly more expensive to maintain.
The Dollar in Freefall: To exit these investments, European investors would need to sell their US dollars. This massive sell-off would likely cause the value of the US dollar to collapse against the Euro.
Global Market Chaos: Because the US Treasury bond is the benchmark for the global financial system, its collapse would trigger a domino effect. Stock markets would likely tank, and borrowing costs worldwide would become unaffordable overnight.
While the military conquest of Greenland remains a shocking concept, this financial “nuclear option” highlights that Europe’s choice to divest could be the ultimate check on such a massive shift in international relations.
Based on President Trump’s public statements about the EU-US trade deal announced on 27 July 2025, here’s how they align or potentially contradict the European Commission’s framing:
Points of Agreement
Both sides emphasize:
The 15% tariff ceiling: Trump confirmed that the U.S. will impose a flat 15% tariff on most EU goods, including cars, which is consistent with the EU’s statement.
Energy and investment commitments: Trump highlighted the EU’s agreement to purchase $750 billion in U.S. energy and invest $600 billion in the U.S., which matches the EU’s announcement.
Strategic product exemptions: Both sides noted that certain products like aircraft parts,chemicals, and pharmaceuticals will receive special treatment or exemptions.
Section 232 investigations: Trump acknowledged that pharmaceuticals and semiconductors will temporarily face 0% tariffspending national security reviews, aligning with the EU’s description.
Here’s where Trump’s tone or framing may differ from the EU’s:
Tariff Framing:
Trump described the deal as a “very powerful” and “biggest of all the deals”, emphasizing tough negotiations and portraying the 15% tariff as a win for the U.S.
EU framing presents the 15% as a ceiling that reduces existing tariffs (e.g., on cars from 25% + 2.5% MFN), suggesting relief rather than escalation.
EU Expectations:
Reports indicate that Europe had hoped for lower tariffs, around 10%, and some EU officials expressed relief mixed with concern over the final deal.
Trump’s tone suggests the EU market was “essentially closed” and now “opened up,” which may not reflect the EU’s view of its own openness.
Military Purchases:
Trump mentioned that the EU would be “purchasing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of military equipment”, a claim not mentioned in the EU’s official statement.
Steel and Aluminum Tariffs:
Trump indicated that 50% tariffs remain for now, with a quota system to be negotiated. The EU emphasized cutting tariffs and protecting against global overcapacity, suggesting a more cooperative tone.
Moreover: the EU-US trade deal announced on 27 July 2025 is a political agreement and not legally binding until it is formally ratified through the EU’s internal procedures, which may require approval from all 27 member states.
What defines a strong NATO ally? Since the alliance’s founding in 1949, debates over burden-sharing have been constant. Donald Trump, both in his first and current term, has sharply criticized European members for underfunding their defense while relying on U.S. protection—and not without reason.
His message is resonating. Belgium’s defense minister recently vowed to end the country’s “national shame” of being NATO’s most notorious free rider. Even Iceland, which lacks a standing army, is exploring how to contribute more meaningfully.
Image: Pixabay
To assess NATO members’ contributions, consider the “three Cs”: cash, capabilities, and commitment.
Cash: More Members Are Meeting Targets—But Is It Enough?
Today, 22 of NATO’s 32 members meet the 2% of GDP defense spending target, a big jump from just seven a decade ago. Italy and Spain are on track to join them this year. But the bar is rising: at the upcoming summit in The Hague, NATO is expected to adopt a new target of 3.5% of GDP, plus 1.5% for supporting infrastructure.
Still, raw spending figures can be misleading. Some countries inflate their numbers by including loosely related expenses under “defense.”
Capabilities: What the Money Buys Matters More
NATO recommends that at least 20% of defense budgets go toward equipment—most members comply, and that threshold may soon rise to 33%. But quantity doesn’t equal quality. Greece, for example, spends heavily on gear, but much of it is aimed at deterring Turkey, not Russia.
The NATO Defense Planning Process aims to align national purchases with alliance needs. After years of counterterrorism focus, the threat from Russia is refocusing priorities. Allies are now being asked to build forces primarily for deterrence in Europe. New “capability targets” expected this month will guide what each country should provide—especially in areas where the U.S. may scale back, like intelligence, long-range strike, and logistics.
Commitment: Who Shows Up?
Operationally, even the most frugal allies are stepping up. Spain leads a multinational brigade in Slovakia; Italy commands one in Bulgaria. Portuguese jets patrol Baltic airspace. Smaller nations like Albania and Slovenia also contribute troops to NATO’s eastern flank.
But NATO wants more. In a major conflict, it aims to deploy 100,000 troops within 10 days and another 200,000 within 30. Without more European investment in recruitment and readiness, those goals may be out of reach—especially without U.S. troops.
A Smarter Division of Labor?
NATO is exploring a “multi-speed” model: larger militaries take on high-end combat roles, while smaller states focus on logistics, cyber, or niche capabilities. Luxembourg, for instance, supports satellite communications and surveillance; Iceland runs an air-defense system.
Getting underperformers like Spain and Italy to specialize more effectively may be key. Encouraging them to invest in maritime capabilities could be a strategic win.
Donald Trump committed an “unprecedented criminal attempt” to remain in power. That is the conclusion of Special Prosecutor Jack Smith in a long-anticipated report on the outgoing U.S. president’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election, which he lost. The report was released today.
AFP
Since Trump won the most recent presidential election, the charges against him have been dropped. The U.S. Department of Justice does not prosecute sitting presidents. The report concludes that there was sufficient evidence to convict Trump, but his upcoming presidency makes that impossible.
The Justice Department submitted the report to Congress early this morning. “The common thread in all of Trump’s criminal activities was deceit,” the report states. “Knowingly and willingly, he made false claims of election fraud. The evidence shows that Trump weaponized these lies to obstruct a federal government function that is fundamental to the U.S. democratic process.”
Although many details of Trump’s attempts to overturn the election were already well known, the document contains, for the first time, a detailed assessment from Smith regarding his investigation. It also includes Smith’s response to Trump and his allies’ claims that the investigation was politically motivated.
Smith argues that his actions against Trump were in defense of the rule of law. He also addressed ongoing criticism from the newly re-elected president. “Trump’s claim that my prosecutorial decisions were influenced or directed by the Biden administration or other political actors is, in one word, ridiculous,” Smith wrote in a letter to the Attorney General about the report.
Quiet Resignation
Smith also intended to indict Trump for illegally storing sensitive national security documents at his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida after leaving the White House in 2021. However, the Justice Department has pledged not to release that part of the investigation publicly, as legal proceedings are still ongoing against two Trump associates charged in the case.
Over the weekend, it was announced that Jack Smith had resigned. His departure had been expected ever since Trump won the election in November. Jack Smith (55), who previously prosecuted war criminals at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, was appointed in 2022 to prosecute Trump.
Trump himself responded in his typical fashion to the report’s release. On Truth Social, he called Smith a “dumb prosecutor who failed to get his case heard before the election.” He did not mention that his own legal team had filed numerous procedures to delay the trial.
Japan and the United States will strengthen their military ties. The two countries announced this in a joint statement. With the cooperation, they say, they are addressing the threats from China and North Korea in the region. They call China’s role “the biggest security challenge”.
Image: APF
According to Japan and the US, China’s policy is aimed at turning international relations in its favor by, among other things, exerting great political, economic and military pressure. British Prime Minister Sunak also signed an agreement to strengthen military ties between Japan and the United Kingdom.
Tensions between China and Taiwan
In the region, there are particularly high tensions between China and Taiwan. The Chinese army regularly conducts exercises near the island state. The Chinese government sees Taiwan as a renegade province. The Taiwanese have a strong ally in the US.
Last August, top American politician Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, which was seen as a provocation by China. In Beijing’s eyes, any visit by a foreign administrator or politician is equivalent to recognition of Taiwan’s independence.
Earlier, US President Joe Biden announced that the US military would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
The military cooperation includes a new naval unit on the Japanese island of Okinawa, not far from Taiwan. The Americans already have a large base there and will expand the existing army. The site is seen as a strategic location in the region, from which it is possible to react quickly.
Additional troops are also stationed on other islands south of Japan. Both countries will also practice multiple times.
Japan strengthens its military
Last year, Japan announced to significantly strengthen its own defense. It will be the largest reinforcement since World War II. Japan feels the threat from North Korea, which regularly fires missiles, and sees that China has expanded its navy and air force in the vicinity of Japan. According to Japan, Chinese naval vessels regularly sail in Japanese territorial waters.
While Russia is gaining ground in eastern Ukraine, there was also positive military news last week. With the weapons received by the West, Ukraine has launched a number of successful attacks against the Russian army and is preparing a counter-offensive against southern cities like Kherson. Ukraine also launched its first attack on a Russian naval base in Crimea.
In addition, a new study by scientists at Yale showed that the sanctions are effective and have now paralyzed the Russian economy.
With the beginning of the transit of food from the Black Sea, the image may arise that Russia would be ready for an agreement. However, this is implausible. The country is already preparing for a long-term conflict and unfortunately Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West could improve significantly in the near future.
First, we must realize that Russia is expanding the conflict to more and more stages. In space, for example: Russia has indicated that it would stop collaborating on the International Space Station, which may endanger the entire project. This also applies to the maritime level: Putin this week approved a new maritime doctrine against American dominance of the world’s seas.
Not to mention the diplomatic scene, where Russia is very active and is trying to influence its image worldwide. In the former Soviet sphere, Putin has visited Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and has held summits with leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Important consultations have been held with regional powers Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In Uzbekistan, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met ministers from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an Asian bloc led by China and Russia.
The same Lavrov also visited Africa, where he disseminated the Russian perspective on the war in Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia and Congo. This ties in with anti-Western sentiment and with the economic concerns of many African leaders, as already demonstrated by Macky Sall, president of Senegal and currently chairman of the African Union.
In Africa, Russia has other instruments. In recent years, the Russian private army, the Wagner Group, has gained influence in countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Libya and more recently Burkina Faso. This could cause unrest on Europe’s borders.
Even more important than Russian diplomacy is that Western unity threatens to crumble. First, take the US. After the summer, the mid-term elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate will take place there and it is very likely that Biden’s position in Washington will weaken. Ukraine is currently not a major topic in the US. Foreign news in the US is about China and Saudi Arabia. However, the main topic on the news is inflation. Rising prices combined with a recession do not bode well for the incumbent government and its ability to conduct coherent foreign policy.
Consider Europe. Here we see a similar dynamic. The pain of higher prices is becoming more and more apparent and this is causing political tensions. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi was the first prominent victim of this when he resigned after clashing with the Five Star Movement over aid packages. After new elections, a right-wing coalition that favors a more positive relationship with Russia could come to power. Everywhere, including in rich countries such as the Netherlands, economic problems will put a lot of pressure on politicians in the coming months.
Tensions will also increase between European countries. The new Italian government will take office at a time of rising interest rates, which will bring renewed concerns about the debt burden of southern European countries. And also think of Eastern Europe. Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, stated last week that the European sanctions policy is failing and that the EU should not align itself with Ukraine, but between Russia and Ukraine. Impending energy shortages will sharpen the dividing line between countries that are more and less dependent on Russian gas.
So it is quite possible that Western unity and support for Ukraine will come under great pressure in the coming months, let alone possible disruptions such as a new corona wave.
This does not mean that Russia is going to win the war or that the West should push for an agreement with Russia now. This is not feasible. But it does mean that we have to think now about what we will do with a weaker position. And that it is time to look more outwardly and launch our own EU diplomatic offensive.
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