For years, European capitals comforted themselves with a convenient euphemism: “hybrid warfare.” It was a neat, bureaucratic label that allowed leaders to file sabotage, arson, cyberattacks, and targeted strikes under the banner of ambiguous gray-zone activity. Because if an act of aggression does not arrive in the form of a declared military invasion, no one is forced to invoke mutual defense clauses, redraw budgets, or make politically uncomfortable decisions.
Recent events in Germany make that comfortable fiction impossible to sustain. When a drone assault targets a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport using military grade explosives and detonators linked directly to Russian state operations, that is not merely an incident. When power substations in Brandenburg and Bergheim are sabotaged within days of each other, and grenades detonate near Ukrainian nationals at Augsburg station, calling it a series of coincidences is willful blindness.
Even Brussels has begun to shift its tone, with European Commission leadership acknowledging the military nature of these operations and calling them what they truly resemble: state-sponsored terrorism on European soil.
Yet naming the threat is only half the battle. The far more alarming issue is the complete absence of a credible response.
Closing two consulates and a cultural institute in response to physical sabotage on critical infrastructure is not deterrence. It is diplomatic theater. It signals to Moscow that operations within the European Union carry virtually zero cost. If the response to orchestrated physical disruption on EU soil remains confined to press releases, rapid-response advisory teams, and modest consular expulsions, then deterrence has failed before it has even begun.
The harsh truth is that Russian intimidation is working, largely because Europe’s domestic politics are beginning to crack under the strain.
Across the continent, war fatigue and economic anxieties are eroding the political resolve needed to push back against aggression. In Germany, regional elections threaten to elevate factions eager to roll back sanctions and sever aid to Kyiv. In Italy, internal political pressure mounts against continued defense commitments. In Belgium, debates stall over mobilizing seized Russian assets. Even in the Netherlands, prominent political voices openly parrot talking points that serve Moscow’s interests, seemingly oblivious to our own recent history and national security vulnerabilities.
Meanwhile, Washington makes no secret of its reluctance to guarantee European security indefinitely. The strategic umbrella that Western Europe relied upon for eight decades is fraying at both ends.
Europe is caught in a dangerous pincer movement: externally targeted by escalating state sabotage, and internally paralyzed by political fragmentation and military dependency. We want the benefits of peace without paying the price of autonomy. We demand security while refusing to build the sovereign industrial and defense capacity required to enforce it.
Looking away has long been Europe’s preferred crisis management strategy. Delay the decision, form a committee, issue a condemnation, and hope the storm passes. But ignoring an adversary who is already operating inside your perimeter does not buy stability. It only guarantees that when the bill finally comes due, the cost will be catastrophic.
If Europe wishes to remain master of its own destiny, it must trade performative outrage for tangible strength. That means real consequences for sabotage, genuine military autonomy, and the political courage to tell citizens the truth: peace is not preserved by looking the other way.
